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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how monetary policy influences the housing market in U.S. with a
special emphasis on the recent financial crisis dating from 2007, which started from the burst
of bubbles in the housing market. Using monthly U.S. data spanning over the period from
January 2000 to July 2011, I estimate Vector Auto-regressive(VAR) models using data for
each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) to analyze the interaction between local housing
markets and monetary policy. Aggregate responses of housing variables to monetary policy
are also estimated by adopting composite data. Empirical results show that employment and
housing price index both respond negatively to a positive monetary policy shock; while the
significance and magnitude of the influence varies across MSAs. Compared to the aggregate
effects, monetary policy is more likely to be effective in the west and the east, namely,
California and Florida, and is more likely to be ineffective in the middle states, namely, Texas.
The regional asymmetry in the efficacy of monetary policy could be resulted by various
sources, like industry composition, housing supply elasticities, and credit condition.
Keywords: housing market, monetary policy, VAR
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Housing is the main form of wealth held by households. According to a Census survey
of asset ownership of households in U.S. in early 2000 and late 20021, the net worth of
own-home equity accounted for 32.3% of the total of household wealth. This rate increased to
41.7% in 2002; while for the second most important wealth form, stock and mutual funds
shares: the numbers were 15.6% and 11.4%, respectively. Through the wealth effect, housing
equity has a direct influence on personal consumption, since people feel more wealthy when
housing equity appreciates, and, thus, are more willing to consume. Since housing takes up a
big portion of household wealth, and personal consumption is a nontrivial part of the
macro-economy, the importance of housing to real economic activity is self-evident.
Housing has also been volatile (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Between 1999:Q1 and
2012:Q4, the standard deviation of real private residential fixed investment is 27% of its
mean, while the percentages for real non-residential fixed investment and real GDP are 9.4%
and 7.6%. Thus, compared to other forms of investment and output, the housing sector is
more volatile.
Housing variables are also thought to be informative. Many studies2 have discussed the
credibility of housing variables as leading indicators of the economy since huge movements
1

Gottschalck, A. O. (2008). Net Worth and the Assets of Households, 2002: US Dept. of Commerce,
Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census.
2
Strauss, Jack (2011). Does housing drive state-level job growth? Building permits and consumer expectations
forecast a state’s economic activity. Journal of Urban Economics 73. 77-93.
Stock, J.H., Watson, M.W. (2003b). Forecasting output growth and inflation: the role of asset prices. Journal
of Economic Literature 41, 788–829.
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in the housing market were often historically observed ahead of the turning point of the
economy historically. Consider housing starts, newly began private residential construction,
for example, as shown in figure 13. Since the 1960s, of all eight recessions experienced,
housing starts have declined dramatically before the recessions, while, after the recessions
started, housing starts have had different directions of change. Among eight recessions, four
recessions observed continuing falling in housing starts until the recession ended, though the
decreases were oscillatory. Thus, while the pickup of housing starts does not necessarily
predict the recovery of the economy, the slump of housing starts does warn us of a recession.
In sum, housing matters because of its significance, volatility, and possible role as a
leading indicator. Since stabilizing economy and economic growth are both goals of
monetary policy, there is potential benefit for the central bank to take the housing sector into
account when forming monetary policy. Questions include whether they should respond to
changes in the housing market and how they should react to such changes.
To answer these two questions, "whether" and "how", one must investigate how the
housing market and monetary policy interact, which motivates this dissertation. Using
monthly data from the U.S., spanning over the period from 2000:01 to 2011:07 on the MSA
level, I explore the link between the housing market and monetary policy. The goal of this
study is to shed a light on the interaction between the housing market and monetary policy in
the last decade and the role the housing market failure in 2006 played in the recession
afterwards.

I OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES
Previous studies employ the VAR model to investigate the interaction between the
housing market and monetary policy. Although different versions have been used, one
3

All figures are placed in the Appendix A.
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underlying assumption is the same: all variables in the model are assumed to be endogenous.
Studies concerning housing and monetary policy have different emphases. Some
investigate cross-sectional differences in the relationship between the housing market and
monetary policy for one country. The response of the housing market to monetary policy is
assumed to be homogeneous. Generally, the stance of monetary policy is measured by the
federal funds rate, as suggested by Bernanke and Blinder (1990), but other variables like the
mortgage rate, money supply, or interest rate spread have also been employed by some
studies. Variables of real economy, like real GDP, personal income, or employment growth
also enter the model. Aoki, Proudman and Vilieghe (2004), Lastrapes (2002), Case, Quigley
and Shiller (2005), Iacoviello (2005), Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008), and Musso,
Neri and Stracca (2011), have studied the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the
housing market of the U.S. or European countries using data at different frequencies, for
different time periods. Generally, the conclusion is that housing prices and housing
investment respond negatively to a contractionary monetary shock such as increase in federal
funds rate or decrease in money supply, as expected. However, Silva (2008b) finds that in the
short run in the U.S., housing permits and mobile housing shipment increase shortly at first in
response to a contractionary monetary shock.
Some studies emphasize the time varying characteristic of the response of the housing
market to monetary policy for a certain region. According to them, the sensitivity of the
housing market to monetary policy is not invariant in time. Many factors may influence this
transmission channel, like financial deregulation, or change in monetary policy rule.
Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) use the data of four European countries which possess different
financial characters and observe heterogeneity in the response of housing markets to
monetary policy shocks. This can be viewed as evidence of time variance of sensitivity of the
housing market to monetary policy since these four countries represent different stages of
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financial environment development, evaluated by the extent of financial liberalization or
efficiency of institutions. Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) think that characteristics of regions,
like initial condition, affect the sensitivity of housing variables to monetary policy. Since,
these characteristics change with time, assumption of homogeneity over time does not hold.
Work by Owyang and Wall (2009) implies that a change in monetary policy rule can be one
source of the time variance of housing sensitivity to monetary policy. They divide the data of
the U.S. from 1960:Q1 to 2002:Q4 into two stages: pre-Volcker stage and Volcker-Greenspan
stage, according to consistency of the monetary policy rule. The conclusion is that change in
the mechanism of monetary policy will also cause the housing market to respond differently
to monetary policy.
Others believe that this regional heterogeneity exists within one country. Carlino and
DeFina (1998), Fratantoni and Schuh (2003), Silva (2008a, 2008b), Del Negro and Otrok
(2007), and Fiedling and Shields (2011) all make efforts to prove this regional heterogeneity.
They use the data of states, MSAs, or cities and compare the responses of regional economies
or housing markets to monetary policy shocks, instead of using the aggregate data of a nation.
All studies observe heterogeneity across regions although sources of heterogeneity are stated
differently and the evidence of those sources is mixed.
Most studies use VAR models, developed by Sims (1980), with different assumptions.
Vansteenkist (2007) employs a Global VAR to study the spill over effect of regional housing
prices since this allows "interdependencies that exist between state level and nation wide
factors"(p.5). Silva (2008a, 2008b) employs the FAVAR (Factor Augmented VAR) to include
more variables into the model since he believes that monetary authority makes decisions
based on an information set too large for a traditional VAR model. This eliminates the price
puzzle. Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) develop a HAVAR (Heterogeneous-Agent VAR) to
allow coefficients to be time varying and regionally heterogeneous. Other VARs like Panel
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VAR, VAR with restriction on signs of certain variables, VECM (Vector Error Correction
Model) and so on, are also employed.

II THE PURPOSE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY
This dissertation investigates how the housing market has responded to the monetary
policy shock during the last decade in the U.S.. To achieve this goal, I include both regional
data and national data: regional employment growth, regional real FNC housing price index,
regional total transaction of housing, regional distressed sales, the MSA population of the
2010 census, federal funds rate, and the federal funds rate residual by Morgan (1993). All
data are monthly.
One contribution of this research is that it uses a more recent time period, from January
2000 to July 2011, which includes the two latest recessions. In the recent recession, housing
prices surged and then plummeted prior to fast growth in the national unemployment rate,
which reached a second highest level after World War II. This recession also distinguished
itself from previous postwar recessions with a huge crash in the housing market and a
relatively longer recovery period. The difference of the recent recession, as well as the time
variant characteristics of monetary transmission mechanism in the housing market, make it
inappropriate to adopt conclusions from previous studies to analyze what has happened
recently. Instead of a small-sample study, my data set includes 119 MSAs covering a wide
part of the U.S., which is beneficial in the efficiency of estimation and the generality of
conclusions. Another merit of this data set is that it is monthly. Since housing variables are
volatile and monetary policy variables usually change quickly, monthly data should be
superior to quarterly or annual data generally used by previous studies in displaying the
pattern of variables.

5

Secondly, I introduce distressed sales, the sales of foreclosed homes, which does not
appear in other studies. The recent crash in the housing market was characterized by high
foreclosure rates. Since distressed sales and foreclosures are closely related, containing
distressed sales should be appropriate for capturing the variation in the housing market in the
recent decade.
Thirdly, previous studies estimate group VARs based on existing geographical
divisions, such as BEA economic areas4 or Census Bureau-Related areas5, to investigate
regional asymmetries of monetary policy in the housing market. Unlike them, this
dissertation defines regions by patterns of housing prices during the housing bust and the
following recession. Following Feroli et al. (2012), I divide 119 MSAs into eight groups
based on both the geographical position and the extent of housing price declines during
2006-2009. One merit of defining regions in this way is that regions are made up of MSAs
having similar initial states; thus, the assumption of homogeneity within groups is more
credible.

III
1

BACKGRAOUND
Correlation Between Housing and Economy on National Level
Data on the U.S. from 1975 to 2012 reveal some facts about the recent recession.
Firstly, the consequences of the recession were severe and the recover period was long.

This can be illustrated by the pattern of the unemployment rate. As shown in figure 2, six
recessions occurred during this period. Since 1985, even though three recessions occurred,
the unemployment rate fluctuated mildly between 4% and 8% until 2007; and between 2001
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Bureau of Economic Analysis economic areas:New England, Midwest, East North Central, West North
Central, East South Central, South Atlantic, West South Central, Mountain and Pacific.
5
Census Bureau-Related areas: North east, Midwest, South and West.
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and 2007, the range narrowed down to 4%-6%. From 1993 to 2001, the unemployment rate
steadily dropped to around 4%, which was the lowest since 1975. The “great moderation”
ended in 2007, the unemployment rate then grew quickly to 10% at the end of the recession.
The increase in the unemployment rate did not stop until a few months after the designated
ending date of the recession.
In previous recessions, it generally took about two years for the unemployment rate to
return to the level it was before the recession, or close to that level. However, the recession in
the early 1990s took the economy about three year. Until the end of 2012, three years after
the recession, the unemployment rate was still nearly 8%, higher than most of the period
since 1975. Historical data on the unemployment rate reveal that the recent recession is
notable in both extent and duration.
Secondly, the recent recession is preceded by acute movements in the housing market
not observed previously, illustrated by figure 3-5.
Since the 1970’s, all recessions were accompanied with some decline in housing prices
except in the early 2000’s. Excluding these recession periods, there has been sustained
appreciation in the housing market until late 2006. By the end of 2006, the national housing
price index released by FHFA (Federal Housing Finance Agency) had increased about 530%
since 1975, with an annual growth rate of 6% on average; from 2000 to 2006, housing prices
grew by nearly 9% every year. Along with this sharp rise in housing prices came fast growth
in housing starts and decline in the foreclosure rate, all indicating the prosperity of the
housing market. In early 2007, a few months before the recession hit, the housing market
reached a turning point, and housing prices as well as housing starts plummeted. Housing
starts dropped to a historical low level before rebounding, and housing prices have not
rebounded as of 2012. The foreclosure rate doubled in the recession and continued to increase.
After the housing market started to crash, the unemployment rate increased. Thus, it is
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reasonable to conjecture that the housing market may have played an important role in the
underperformance of the economy in the recession. The housing crash may have also
contributed to the impotence of monetary policy afterwards because the housing market may
have nontrivial influence on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.6

2

Correlation Between Housing and Economy at the Regional Level
While national housing and macroeconomic data tell us something about the correlation

between the housing crash and the recent recession, regional data provide more detailed
evidence.
Following Feroli et al. (2012), who divide the nation into four groups by the extent of
decline in housing prices during 2006-2009 using the FHFA house price index, I choose one
state from each group and compare the states’ data with national data.
Four states, Texas, New York, Oregon and California represent states with declining
housing prices from mild to severe during 2006-2009. Specifically, housing price index for
Texas increased by around 2.5%; while housing price indexes for New York, Oregon, and
California decreased by 9.23%, 22.31%, and 34.41%, respectively. Figure 6 suggests that,
following the national trend, all four states experienced a long period of housing appreciation
that began in 1990. Before the housing crash, the housing price index for California started
lower than the national one but ended much higher than all other regions at the peak.
However, after the peak, it plummeted to below even the housing price index for Texas
occasionally, which was almost always the lowest among five regions since 1990. In addition,
the housing price index for Texas was more stable than other regions, which may suggest that
the rebound of the housing market is related to the initial state.

6

Feroli et al. (2012)
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The regional unemployment rates also suggest there is a relationship between the real
economic activity and the housing market. In figure 7, unemployment rates of different
regions show similar trends at the same time period, while difference exists in the magnitudes
of the value and the extent of changes.
Since 2006, the unemployment rates stayed relatively stable for a few months after the
housing crash had already started. At the beginning of the recession, the ranking of
unemployment rates among the four states mirrored that of magnitude of declining in the
housing prices index, with Texas and New York lower than the national level and California
higher than all other regions. During the recession, the unemployment rates grew fast for all
regions while in California and Oregon, the speed of growth was higher compared to other
regions. Therefore, areas with larger crash in the housing market had deeper depression in
term of the increase in the unemployment rate.
The recovery following the recession also exhibited regional heterogeneity. Since the
middle of 2009, the economy began to rebound as unemployment rates started to decline for
all areas. In Texas and New York, the unemployment rates fell more gradually than in
California and Oregon. In early 2012, unemployment in Texas, New York and Oregon
increased for a short period while in California it continued to decrease. This heterogeneity
may be evidence of the asymmetric effects of monetary policy across regions since the
Federal Reserve had taken various measures to halt the recession, lowering the federal funds
rate, increasing the non-borrowed reserve, and so on .

9

3 The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
Another thing discussed a lot is whether monetary policy was ineffective in the recent
recession7. Since 2007, the federal funds rate has been lowered to close to zero to stimulate
the aggregate demand. Other untraditional operations were taken, like Quantitative Easing
and Operation Twist, to stimulate the economy. However, in spite of the efforts by the Federal
Reserve, the performance of the economy was still disappointing. Until the end of 2012, three
years after the end of the recession, the national unemployment rate was still as high as 8%,
while in the previous recessions after 1975, it usually took two years for the unemployment
rate to return to the pre-recession level. Thus, in the last recession, monetary policy did not
appear to be as effective as it was in the past.
In sum, during the recent recession, data suggest that the dismal performance of the
housing market may have contributed to the deep depression, and this relationship varied by
regions. Otherwise, since the transmission mechanism in the housing market is an important
channel of monetary policy, it is worthwhile to discuss what has changed in the monetary
transmission mechanism in the housing market and what role the recent housing crash has
played in the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. That is the goal of this dissertation.

IV ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This dissertation is divided into four parts. The next chapter provides a review of
literatures; chapter three describes the data, and chapter four describes the main model and
concludes.

7

Frederic S. Mishkin (2009), Cúrdia, Vasco, Woodford, Michael (2010), Feroli et al. (2012).
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A lot of research has been done to explore the role of the housing market in the recent
long, painful recession and the slow recovery that followed. Among these researches, one
critical issue is the interaction between monetary policy and the housing market.
In monetary literature, the interest rate channel is the traditional transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. As the opportunity cost of investment, the interest rate directly affects
residential investment. Thus, through this channel, housing variables are expected to respond
negatively to tight monetary policy, like increasing the federal funds rate. Another channel of
monetary policy is the wealth effect channel. Appreciation in properties like housing
increases the wealth held by people and thus motivates them to consume more in the present.
Another traditional transmission channel is the credit channel. Through this channel, the
central bank has influence on the external financing premium, through two possible linkages:
the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel. The balance sheet channel focuses
on the financial status of the borrower, which works by changing the borrowing cost, or by
devaluating the assets the borrower holds. In contrast, the bank-lending channel involves the
lender. Monetary policy influences the decision of lending institutions to make loans, which
gives borrowers access to capital. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the role of the
bank-lending channel is more uncertain than the credit channel due to financial deregulation
and financial innovation in recent decades.
Mishkin (2007) holds a different opinion on the transmission channels of monetary
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policy. He argues monetary policy works through the short-term interest through six channels
and he summarizes them as “the user cost of capital, expectation of future house price
movement, housing supply, standard wealth effects from house prices, balance sheet and
credit-channel effects on consumer spending as well as housing demand” (p.5). Though each
channel may play a role, Mishikin believes there is a difference in the extent of importance.
In addition, the forces of influence change over time with financial innovations, like
securitization. Therefore, it is uncertain how monetary policy will affect the housing market
and the whole economy. In this sense, Mishikin asserts that the monetary authority should
take measures against changes in the housing market only when the consequences of these
changes in the real economy are predictable. Thus, monetary policy makers should always
watch out for the harm brought by the housing market to the economy, although it is not
always necessary for policy makers to respond to change in the housing market.
Carlino and DeFina (1998) offer a detailed discussion of different channels of
monetary transmission mechanism using quarterly regional data of the U.S. spanning from
1958 to 1992. Specifically, they want to see whether effects of monetary policy are
symmetric across different regions. The structural VAR model they employ includes real
personal income growth, employment growth, price of energy deflated by inflation, and
multiple monetary policy variables for robustness test. They find that in regional models, like
New England, Mideast, Plains, Southeast,and the Far West, personal income responds to a
monetary policy shock similarly to the national model; while in other regions, personal
income is either more sensitive (Great Lakes) or less sensitive (South West and Rocky
Mountains) than the nation as a whole. The authors also estimate VARs for each of the 48
states, adding further support to the presence of heterogeneity in response to monetary policy.
However, when they try to investigate the source of the heterogeneity, conclusions are mixed.
For the interest channel, they use the share of manufacturing industry in real gross state
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product (GSP) as an indicator, since the manufacturing industry is sensitive to interest rates.
The authors get statistically significant positive coefficients as expected, since areas with
higher concentration of manufacturing industry should be more sensitive to changes in
interest rate and thus monetary policy. For the broad credit channel, the authors use the share
of small firms, which hire less than 250 employees, since they have less access to loans and
thus are subject to changes in interest rate. Therefore, increase in the percentage of small
firms should enlarge the influence of a monetary policy shock. The coefficients for small firm
are found to be positive but are only statistically significant at 10% level. Finally, for the bank
lending channel, they use loans approved by small banks, which hold assets less or equal to
the 90th percentile in assets of national data in 1982 and small banks do not belong to a bank
holding company. The signs of coefficients Carlino and DeFina find are negative, different
from the results of Kashyap and Stein (1995). Thus, in spite of adding support to the regional
asymmetry of monetary policy, Carlino and DeFina makes no verdict on which transmission
channel has taken effect and results in regional heterogeneity.
While admitting the importance of the housing market to the economy, Cecchetti et al.
(2000) think that the influence of the housing market on inflation outweighs that on real
economic activity, both of which change with time and countries. In addition, including
housing prices into the measurement and forecast of the core inflation is superior to using
stock prices since housing prices contain more information about variation in aggregate price
level and less noises. Otherwise, reacting at asset prices can stabilize both price level and
output level based on classic Poole (1970) analysis and inter-temporal intuition. To prove it,
they conduct simulation using models developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Batini
and Nelson (2000). Unlike Bernanke and Gertler (2001), who oppose reacting to stock prices,
Cecchetti et al. find that in most cases of bubble, the monetary authority should respond with
interest rate, even though the action may be fine. They also suggest that policy makers should
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try to avoid misalignment that can be identified in asset prices instead of just ignoring these
price misalignments. Asset prices contain information on current and future inflation, which
outweighs their impact on output level. Misalignment in asset prices is harmful, and avoiding
it is beneficial for policy makers. Still, it is not necessary to target asset prices or put it as a
goal of policy.
Goodhart and Hoffmann (2001) believe that asset prices are important in the monetary
transmission mechanism, through the wealth effect channel and balance sheet channel.They
employ the data of G7 countries (USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK and Canada), from
1973:Q1 to 1998:Q4. Estimation results of OLS and a reduced form VAR prove that real
housing prices have significant influences on output gap and inflation and respond negatively
to interest rate (except Italy and Germany). Given the importance of the housing sector,
Goodhart and Hoffmann construct the Financial Conditions Index (FCI) to measure the
stance of monetary policy. Different from the MCI (Monetary Condition Index), which is
generally used, the FCI includes weighted real asset prices, like housing prices and stock
prices. Weights are coefficients of reduced form demand functions or IRF from estimated
VAR. In both ways, housing price is assigned a higher weight than stock prices. Empirical
results show that the FCI improves the in-sample forecasting for inflation significantly, while
for the out-of-sample forecasting, the improvement is less obvious.
Aoki et al. (2004) are interested in the role of housing equity as the collateral in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy on consumption and how it has changed given
financial development in the UK. The authors use quarterly data of output, inflation, oil
prices, housing prices, housing investment, consumption for durable goods and non-durable
goods, and short term interest rates from 1975:Q2 to 1999:Q4, including the period of
deregulation in the mortgage market: 1980-1986. They apply the financial accelerator model
developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) to the household sector under the
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premise that housing is used as the collateral; thus variation in housing prices affects the
budget constraint of the borrower, and monetary policy follows the Taylor Rule. Facing an
unexpected expansionary monetary shock, housing prices increase and so does the collateral
value of housing, which relaxes the borrowing constraint of the borrower and thus stimulates
consumptions. As a result, the effect of monetary policy is amplified on consumption.
Deregulation in the mortgage market in the early 1980s has also played a role. The conjecture
is that with easier and cheaper access to housing properties, people are more willing to
choose current consumption other than the future benefit of increase in collateral value. Thus
the influence of monetary policy on consumption is propagated while its influence on the
housing sector is dampened. Empirical results from VAR (Aoki et al., 2004) show that that
both housing prices and housing investment respond negatively to an unexpected increase in
the interest rate, while the magnitude of the response is smaller than before the deregulation,
verifying the conjecture made earlier about housing properties.
Lastrapes' work (2002) adds to the literature which supports the view that money matters
in the housing sector in the short run, using monthly aggregate data of the U.S.. To properly
identify a money supply shock, he estimates VARs subject to two different restrictions. One
depends on the neutrality of money in the long run; another one only depends on the
contemporaneous relationship between variables. Two different sets of variables are used: one
covers the period from January 1963 to August 1999 while another one is from January 1968
to April 1999. Both contain variables of real economical activities, housing, and monetary
policy. Estimation results show that real housing prices and housing sales respond positively
to an expansionary money policy shock in the short run under both restrictions, with
differences in the magnitude and pattern of responses. Unlike previous studies that generally
use the interest rate, Lastrapes employs multiple measures of monetary policy and gets
similar links between the housing market and monetary policy, suggesting that this
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interaction is robust to the choice of monetary variables.
Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) criticize previous monetary researches for ignoring the
influences of regional economies on responses of national economy to monetary policy and
assuming that this response stays the same over time. To address this problem, they develop
the Heterogeneous-agent VAR (HAVAR) model using the quarterly data of 27 MSAs in the
U.S. from 1986:Q3 to 1996:Q2. According to the authors, this framework is a combination of
monetary VAR by Christiano, Echenbaum and Evans (1999) and VAR by Carlino and DeFina
(1998), which allows regional heterogeneity. Both national data and regional data are
included with mortgage rate as the link between these two sets of variables, since it is
influenced by the uniform monetary policy across the country and has direct influence on
regional economies. Historical data show that regions respond to monetary policy differently,
with housing being one important source of this heterogeneity. Given that at the time when
monetary authority takes actions, regions dominating the national response to this action and
initial economic status of regions are different over time, the aggregate responses to monetary
policy are time varying and state dependent. The estimation results of HAVAR reveal that
housing investment and housing appreciation respond negatively to a tightening policy shock
across all regions; and asymmetries exist in both durations and magnitudes of impulse
responses. Fratantoni and Schuh also compare the results of conventional VAR with those of
HAVAR and find discrepancy in two groups of results, which implies that the efficacy of
monetary policy may have to be rejudged, especially in the housing sector. This study sheds a
light on regional heterogeneity in the monetary-housing linkage, but it fails to investigate the
source of this heterogeneity because of lack of a structural model and limitation in data.
Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005) stress the difference between wealth effects of the
stock equity and the housing equity on consumption and point out that wealth effect of
housing prices outweighs that of stock prices. They criticize previous literature for lacking a
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convincing measure of housing values, which results in big sampling variances and
inconclusiveness in interpreting results. To conquer this problem, they use a comprehensive
data set including annual data of 14 developed countries8 over the period of 1975-1999 and
also the quarterly data of U.S. states during 1982-1999. Linear models are estimated under
different specifications, such as first difference, fixed effect, etc. Estimation results support
the existence of wealth effects of both stock prices and housing prices, while the latter is
more important and consistent across countries, reaffirming the idea that housing matters.
The authors admit that one limitation of this study is that it fails to include the recent
worldwide housing boom that started after 2000.
Iacoviello (2005) introduces collateral constraint and nominal debt into the financial
accelerator model (Bernanke and Gertler,1999), which allows housing to play a direct role in
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy since a large portion of loans are secured by
housing. Thus, tight monetary policy takes effect through three channels, stated as (1) the
interest rate channel: assuming price stickiness, investment and further output are both
depressed; (2) the house price channel: lower housing prices responding to increasing interest
rate tightens the financial constraint on firms and households and thus amplifies the
downward pressure on investment and output since housing is an important form of collateral;
(3) the debt deflation channel: increasing interest rate deflates prices and causes the payment
of unindexed debt to rise, which further depresses investment and consumption. The house
price channel is based on the negative relationship between housing prices and monetary
policy, which is verified by the estimation of a VAR model later. The data set Iacoviello uses
covers the period from 1974:Q1 to 2003:Q2 in the U.S.. However, although output and asset
prices interact, for the author, it is not necessary for the central bank to respond to asset price
changes since the effect in stabilizing output or inflation is insignificant.
8

Those 14 countries are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and Spain.
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Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) examine the existence of the credit channel, the bank
lending channel, and the balance sheet channel on households in four European countries
(Finland, Germany, Norway, and the UK) from 1978:Q4 to 1999:Q4. These four countries are
chosen for their different housing financing systems, characterized by forms of depository
institution and their efficiency. Thus, heterogeneity in responses of housing variables to a
monetary policy shock can also be viewed as evidence of financial development influencing
monetary transmission mechanism in the housing market. Estimating VAR and VECM for
each country, the authors find that, except in Norway, at least one form of the credit channel
exists in other three countries; but there is uncertainty in the coexistence of both forms in one
country (Finland and UK). The mixed evidence of the presence of different transmission
channels of monetary policy indicate that the link between the housing market and monetary
policy is subject to time varying factors, and these changes should be taken into account, as
pointed out by Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
Vansteenkist (2007) investigates the intrastate spill-over effects of housing prices and
the influence of long term interest rates on the housing market using the data of the 31
biggest states in the U.S. from 1986:Q3 to 2005:Q4. Using Global VAR (GVAR), he finds
spill over effects among states, whose magnitudes depend on the origin of housing prices
shock. For example, the biggest spill-over effect in housing prices is observed in surrounding
states given a 10% shock in housing prices in California. He also finds that long term interest
rates have relatively small influences on housing prices in the long run and their contributions
to the housing appreciation vary across regions. Since efficacies of monetary policy vary
across regions, probably due to regional heterogeneity in the sensitivity to interest rates and
in the initial state at the time of the execution of monetary policy, monitoring economical
states of regions may be worthwhile.
Vargas-Silva explores the impact of monetary policy on the housing market by
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estimating VARs9 with sign restrictions (2008a) and FAVAR (2008b). Silva controls for the
signs of responses for variables except for housing starts and residential investment in the
face of a monetary policy shock for a certain period. He finds that after imposing sign
restriction, both housing starts and residential investment still respond negatively to a
contractionary monetary policy shock, but the size and duration of the responses will change
with the time span that the restriction holds. The author also observes regional heterogeneity
in the efficacy of monetary policy on the housing market: the influence of monetary policy on
housing is stronger in the Midwest compared to the other three areas. Silva (2008b) uses
FAVAR to include an ample set of variables that affect monetary policy without loss of
degree of freedom. Upon a contractionary monetary policy shock, housing starts, both
national and regional, decrease immediately, with regional heterogeneity in responses, while
housing permits and mobile home shipments increase at first, then decrease after a few time
periods, contradicting traditional theory. The author concludes that, in the long run, tightening
monetary policy depresses the housing market; however, in the short run, the efficacy of
monetary policy on the housing market is subject to the chosen variable.
Del Negro and Otrok (2007) believe that two sets of factors have contributed to the
housing boom: national ones that give rise to the co-movement of housing prices across
regions and local ones that create heterogeneity in regional housing price movements. They
also believe that the relative importance of national factors and regional factors change over
time. To sort out roles played by national and regional factors in historical housing booms,
especially in the recent one, Del Negro and Otrok employ a dynamic factor model via the
Bayesian method, using U.S. state data10 from 1986:Q1 to 2005:Q4. They find that national
factors, such as a monetary policy shock, play a bigger role in the recent housing appreciation,
from 2001-2005, than in previous decades, while the influence of regional factors has been
9

Silva (2008a) uses monthly data of U.S. from Jan 1965 to Dec 2005. Silva (2008b) use monthly data of U.S.
from Jan 1959 to Aug 2001 .
10
Hawaii and Alaska excluded.
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dampened recently. To investigate this impact of monetary policy on the housing prices, the
authors estimate VARs with sign restriction under alternative identification procedures.
Estimation results show that the influence of monetary policy is nontrivial but may not be the
main force behind the recent housing appreciation. They also find regional heterogeneity in
responses of housing factors to an expansionary monetary policy shock on the state level,
which used to be mostly a consequence of local factors. Thus, this paper provides evidence
that interaction between the housing market and monetary policy has been changing over
time, and regional heterogeneity is notable.
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) study the impact of monetary policy on
residential property, equity prices, and economic activity in 17 OECD countries11 using
quarterly data spanning 1986-2006. They first employ VAR for each individual country to
capture the impact of monetary policy on inflation, output, property prices, and equity prices.
Then they divide these 17 countries into two groups based on their financial characteristics
and use a Panel VAR model for a more accurate relationship between monetary policy and
economies. The main conclusions from their estimation are: (1) although monetary policy
affects both residential property prices and equity prices, equity prices take longer to respond
to monetary policy shock. Thus, it is impossible for monetary policy to eliminate variation in
both prices simultaneously. And (2) asset prices are more sensitive to a monetary policy
shock than inflation and real output. Thus, actions to stabilize asset prices by monetary
authority may accompany bigger losses in inflation and real output. (3) Financial structures
contribute to the heterogeneity in asset price response to monetary policy. Thus, according to
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, the monetary authority should be more cautious while
responding to asset price variation by monetary policy.
Gupta and Kabundi (2010) assess the relationship between the growth rate of real house
11

These 17 countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and U.S..
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prices and monetary policy by adopting the FAVAR model with quarterly data from the nine
U.S. Census divisions12 from 1976:Q1 to 2005:Q2. They find the evidence of regional
heterogeneity: house prices in most regions behave similarly to national housing prices,
decreasing immediately when confronted with an unexpected increase in the interest rate,
while in New England and the Middle Atlantic, housing prices increase first and then
decrease, which is not however statistically significant. Gupta and Kabundi agree with
Carlino and Defina (1999) and Vargas-Silva (2008a) that some regions, like the South (South
Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Cental), play a more important role in shaping
the national pattern of housing price movement than others. They specifically mention the
Pacific division, including California and Arizona, which witnessed the biggest housing
inflation until 2006. The idiosyncratic roles of regions played in the pattern of national
housing sector vindicate the updated research of the housing sector and monetary policy.
Musso et al. (2011) compare patterns of movements in residential investment, real
housing prices, and mortgage debt in Europe and the U.S. During the period
1986:Q1-2009:Q2, especially during the period 1997-2009. They find similarities as well as
differences between the two areas. Housing variables and mortgage debt are pro-cyclical
while mortgage spread is countercyclical in both regions, but the cyclical correlation between
real housing prices and mortgage debt is much larger in the U.S.. Given these facts, they
estimate SVAR using the Bayesian method for each area to find out the influence of shock in
monetary policy, the demand side of housing, and the supply side of credit indicated by
mortgage debt, respectively. Specifically, they are interested in the role played by housing in
the conduct of monetary policy. Estimation results show that facing a monetary policy shock,
real economical variables like consumption and housing variables are more responsive in the
U.S. than in Europe. They also make attempt to analyze the spill over effect of housing price

12

Census division: South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and the Pacific divisions.
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between Europe and the U.S. by putting variables of two areas into one VAR model.
Estimation results suggest that the U.S. seems to have a larger impact on Europe than Europe
does on the U.S.; however, this conclusion may be subject to the ordering of variables and
thus is tentative. Among their findings, two more things are noticeable: the estimation of
SVAR suggests that there is a temporary “price puzzle” in the U.S., but not in Europe; the
relationship between housing prices and mortgage debt has changed since 1997. Combined
with the statistical significance of difference in responses of variables of Europe and the U.S.
to a monetary policy shock, the monetary-housing linkage should change with time and
regions.
The study by Fielding and Shield (2011) provides further evidence of the existence of
regional heterogeneity in the efficacy of monetary policy on price level, using data from 29
U.S. cities from December 1986 to June 1996. Their data are mainly from two sources: Engel
and Rogers (2001), providing data of CPI and its components for cities, and Romer and
Romer (2004), providing a measurement of monetary policy shock by reading FOMC
meeting records. They also use other measurements of the stance of monetary policy, like the
Kuttner (2001) monetary policy shock, change in actual federal funds rate, and so on, for
comparison. They find that in the face of a Romer and Romer (2004) shock, responses of
prices in different cities are heterogeneous, and these differences are statistically significant
across cities, which stays valid if monetary policy shock is measured by the change in the
federal funds rate. They attribute this asymmetry to economical, financial, and demographical
factors like industry structure, housing prices, age composition, bank volume, and so on. For
example, they observe that cities with higher property values respond more sensitively to
monetary policy while cities with larger bank size (similar to a balance sheet channel)
respond less sensitively to monetary policy. However, the sign for manufacturing intensity,
often taken as an indicator of the interest rate channel, contradicts the findings of Carlino and
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DeFina (1998), which Fielding and Shield think is due to different levels of data employed
and the focus on effect on price level, instead of on output.
Feroli et al. (2012) focus on how the housing market has influenced the effectiveness
of monetary policy while discussing the interaction between the housing market and
monetary policy. According to them, the sluggishness in the housing sector contributes both
directly and indirectly to the prolonged resumption of economy since 2009, due to housing’s
significance to the economy and possible impairment to the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy; expansionary monetary policy should have been less effective in the recent
recovery since credit is actually tighter, even though the interest rate is lower. Using U.S.
national data from 1975:Q1 to 2010:Q4, Feroli et al. estimate a housing demand function
using OLS. The main finding is that there is huge surplus in the housing market, which
requires the interest rate to be very negative to eliminate. They also estimate state-level OLS
models to vindicate the impairment on efficacy of monetary policy caused by housing. The
presumption is that policy is more effective in areas experiencing smaller declines in the
housing market. Empirical results show that areas with larger housing price declines have
feebler restoration in residential investment and durable consumption, which suggests that
transmission channel of monetary policy is weaker.
Besides monetary policy, other factors have also been taken into account to explore the
pattern of housing prices. Foreclosure is among these factors. On one hand, when housing
prices decrease, volume of foreclosure is expected to increase. By definition, foreclosure is
accomplished when housing prices depreciate largely. Since assets held by people are
devaluated, people are more likely to default. On the other hand, increase in foreclosure has
influence on housing prices. This interaction is especially of interest given the fast upswing in
foreclosure and tepid re-bounce of housing prices in the recent recovery.
One inspiring work is done by Campell, Giglio and Pathak (2011), who study the
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impact of forced sales on housing prices, with foreclosure being one important form of forced
sales, especially since 2007. This impact is nontrivial because of the amplification by the
illiquidity of the housing market. Estimating a hedonic model using the data of Massachusetts,
they find that foreclosure discounts the property value by 27% on average from 1987 to
2009:Q1. This value varies with the time-span after the foreclosure and the distance from the
location of the foreclosure. They also measure the spillover effect of foreclosure on
neighborhood housing prices. After controlling for the radius of occurrence of foreclosures,
they find a solid relationship between foreclosures and housing prices. Especially, within 0.05
miles from the foreclosed properties, the housing prices are discounted by about 1%.
Furthermore, the magnitude of this influence changes with timing of sales after foreclosure,
distance from the foreclosed properties as well as the type of housing, and also exhibits
regional heterogeneity.
Rogers and Winter (2009) use the data of St. Louis county in Missouri from 1998 to
2007. They get a statistically significant negative relationship between foreclosures and
housing prices employing a hedonic model corrected for spacial error and sample bias. But
the negative influence of foreclosure on housing prices is less important in magnitude and is
more limited in scope compared to previous studies. They believe that various factors, such
as the choice of model, time period, and regional heterogeneity of housing markets, could
have caused the quantitive relationship between foreclosure and housing prices to vary. They
include a quadratic term of foreclosure volume, specified by timing and distance, to measure
the marginal effect of foreclosure on housing prices. Their finding is that the marginal impact
of foreclosure on housing prices decreases as the number of foreclosure increases but this
conclusion could be problematic.
Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao (2007) research the impact of foreclosure on housing prices.
They employ the standard hedonic pricing model and control for the characteristics of houses,
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geographical characteristics, quarterly fixed effects and so on. They use the data of the
Chicago PMSA ( Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area) from 1990 to 2006, where the rate of
foreclosure went above the national level. Models estimated provide evidence for a
statistically significant negative spillover effect on housing prices, providing that spacial
distance between sales and foreclosure is within 0.9 kilometers and the temporal distance is
within five years. Specifically, housing prices can be discounted by at most 8.7% by a nearby
or recent foreclosure. And this influence decreases as the position of sales gets further from
foreclosed properties or the time interval between sales and foreclosure gets longer.
Otherwise, this relationship is also affected by the status of the housing market. Estimation
results suggest that the spillover effect of foreclosure is much smaller in a “good year,” the
year of a housing boom like 2003, than in a “bad year,” the year of a housing bust like 2006.
Mian, Sufi and Trebbis (2011) also explore responses of residential investment and
durable consumption, besides housing prices, to foreclosures using nationwide data. They
introduce a dummy variable—the judicial requirement for foreclosure—as the instrumental
variable for foreclosure since judicial states generally have lower rates of foreclosure. They
collect the data, which covers the period from 2000 to 2009, of housing prices, foreclosure,
new residential permits, auto sales, delinquencies and so on, of states, CBSAs, and areas near
the boarder of judicial and non-judicial states which covers period from 2000 to 2009.
Estimation results of two-stage least square show that foreclosure is negatively related to
housing prices, residential investment, and auto sales. Approximately, from 2007 to 2009,
foreclosure contributes to about 20-30% of decline in housing prices, 15-25% of decline in
residential investment, and 20-35% of decline in auto sales. Moreover, Mian et al. think that
foreclosure may have played a critical role in the recent long and painful recession due to its
nontrivial influences on both housing variables and real economical variables.
So far, it is safe to conclude that even though the importance of the housing market is
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supported by most studies, opinions are divided on the question of whether the central bank
should react to changes in the housing market. Some argue that the central bank should react
to movements in the housing market if certain conditions are satisfied, like Mishkin (2007).
While others claim that the central bank could include housing price changes into its
information set for forecasting instead of directly targeting these changes, like Cecchetti et al.
(2002), given the uncertainty in the responses of the housing market to monetary policy
change.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA DESCRIPTION

This section presents definitions, summary statistics and main hypotheses used for
modeling:
I VARIABLE DEFINITION
Data are collected to measure movements in regional housing markets, regional real
economical activities, and the stance of national monetary policy at monthly frequency.
⒈ Housing Variables

Three housing variables are included: housing price index13, distressed sales18, and total
number of transaction18 including both distressed sales and non-distressed sales, all of which
are regional and monthly.
⑴ Housing Price Index:
The FNC housing price index is constructed by estimating hedonic models with spatial
correlation. This housing price index is superior to median price indexes, like the NAR
housing price index, or repeat-sales price indexes, like FHFA index, in several ways,
according to Dorsey, Hu, Mayer and Wang (2010). Firstly, it allows the qualities of properties
to change. Secondly, it covers a big portion of total transactions, unlike FHFA housing price
index, which only considers repeated sales, and thus should be more accurate in capturing the
pattern of housing prices. Thirdly, it allows coefficients of attributes to vary with time and
13

Data source: FNC National Collateral Database.
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spill-over effects from neighboring properties. Thus, adopting this index should be beneficial
for including a bigger sample.
⑵ Distressed Sales
Distressed sales include foreclosure, short sales and so on, which generally happen when
borrowers are short in liquidity and thus in urgent need of selling14. Therefore, distressed
sales are often accompanied by reduction in housing prices.
⑶ Total housing transaction
Total housing transaction describes the three-month moving average of regional
transaction volume at the current housing price level, containing both distressed sales and
non-distressed sales.
⒉ Economic activity variables

⑴ Employment
Monthly data of employment for MSAs are available on website of Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).
⑵ Commodity Price Index (CPI)
CPI measures the price level at which commodities and services are purchased and, thus,
is usually used to measure inflation. In this dissertation, CPI for all urban consumers, all
items included, is used to deflate nominal variables, like housing price index.
⒊ Monetary Variables
⑴ Federal Funds Rate ( ffr)
ffr is often used as indicator of monetary policy stance15. Since ffr is daily-released and
is believed to be under the control of the Fed, it may disclosure instant changes in monetary
policy. Generally, lowering ffr suggests an action of expansion, which is stated as a negative
14

Leventis,Andrew et al.(2009). The Impact of Distressed Sales on Repeat-Transactions House Price Indexes.
FHFA Research Paper.
15
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Iacoviello (2005) and Vargas-Silva (2008).
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shock to monetary policy, vice versa.
⑵ ffr_r
Morgan (1993) suspects the credibility of ffr as the measure of monetary policy stance
given the identification issue. Thus, he constructs a residual indicator to replace ffr, which is
referred as ffr_r. The ffr_r is obtained by a two stage procedure16, with a positive residual
suggesting a tightening policy while a negative one suggesting an expansionary policy.
All variables are transformed to satisfy stationary assumption according to Stock and
Watson (2002).

II

SAMPLE PERIOD
Period studied in this dissertation spans from Jan 2000 to July 2011. This time period

includes two recessions: the one from March 2001 to Nov 2001 and the one from Dec 2007
to June 2009. Tremendous movements had been observed in the housing market during this
period, especially in the recent recession. Coincidence of the huge crash in the housing
market and the uncertainty in efficacy of monetary policy motivates this dissertation which
detects the role of the housing market in the recent recession and recovery.

III

MAIN HYPOTHESES
This dissertation utilizes VAR model which assumes all variables endogenous. Main

hypotheses are as following:
⑴ When employment decreases, real housing prices should decrease and distressed sales

should increase, we would expect monetary authority to ease monetary policy to stimulate the
16

Morgan (1993) regresses ffr on its lagged values, current and lagged values of output growth and inflation., a
constant and a trend variable. To match the frequency of data, I use the monthly estimates of real GDP available
at www.macroadvisers.com
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economy.
Low employment rate indicates weak aggregate demand and low output level, and thus
depresses the housing demand. Under the framework of demand-supply model, with housing
demand shifting to the left, the real housing prices would decrease, devaluating the real
estates held by home owners. The depreciation in housing equities may incite urgent sales of
houses since people want to avoid larger loss in future, if they hold the belief that the decline
in housing prices would continue. As a result, distressed sales increase when housing prices
continue to decrease. Meanwhile, home owners that get laid off are less able to pay for the
interest of loans and more likely to default, which also would cause distressed sales to
increase. To stimulate the economy, the monetary authority would conduct an expansionary
action, lowering ffr, for example.

(2) Tighter monetary policy would reduce housing prices and employment, and raise
distressed sales.
In face of a positive monetary policy shock, employment should decrease due to the
shrink of aggregate demand. Housing demand also shrinks, thus real housing prices should
also decline. Distressed sales are expected to increase because of growth in interest payment
and depreciation of housing prices raising the possibility of default as well as the need to sell
in urgent.

(3) Rising housing prices would cause distressed sales to decrease, the employment to
increase, and may trigger a monetary tightening.
Through the wealth effect, housing price appreciation may turn out to be a stimulus to
the aggregate demand; as demand for labor also increases, employment would rise. To
restrain the overheating in the housing market and the whole economy, a contractionary
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action by the monetary authority may be needed.

(4) Increase in distressed sales would decrease housing prices as well as employment, and
may trigger a monetary easing.
Multiple studies have provided evidence that housing prices respond negatively to the
upswing in distressed sales17. Growing distressed sales and falling housing prices bring about
a loss to home owners, suppressing aggregate demand and therefore lowering employment.

⑸ Tight monetary policy has a larger influence on employment in areas where interest rate
sensitive industries are concentrated, through the interest rate channel.
Industry composition is an important source of regional heterogeneity in monetary
policy efficacy, according to Crone (2007). Interest rate sensitivities vary among industries,
thus the impact of monetary policy varies with the industry composition. Evidence is
provided by Carlino and Defina (1998, 1999), Owyang and Wall (2005, 2009), Chiodo and
Owyang (2003), and Taylor and Yücel (1996). They reach similar conclusions: monetary
policy is more effective on variables like real personal income in areas where interest rate
sensitive industries, like manufacturing and construction18, cluster.

⑹ Tightening monetary policy is more effective on housing prices in areas with inelastic
housing supply.
Tightening monetary policy shifts the housing demand to the left by raising the user cost
of housing. Thus, given the same shift in the housing demand, areas with inelastic housing
supply would expect larger decline in housing prices than the ones with elastic housing
17

Lin et al. (2007), Rogers and Winter (2009).
Irvine and Schuh (2004) calculate sensitivities of interest rate of 27 SIC industry and find that manufacturing
and construction are more responsive to changes in monetary policy. Chiodo and Owyang (2003) offers
explanations from both supply and demand sides: firms and consumers are more likely to be involved in loans to
produce and to buy, and thus more dependent on changes in the real interest rate.
18
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supply, under the framework of demand and supply model.

⑺ Tight Monetary policy is more effective in the housing sector in areas where credit is less

available.
Monetary policy also affects the real economy, including the housing sector, by
influencing the financial constraint imposed on real economy, including the housing sector.
Thus, the initial state of credit in corresponding areas may influence the efficacy of monetary
policy. Monetary policy is expected to be more effective if credit is tight at the onset of the
action taken by monetary authority, since the credit constraint is stronger. The difficulty of
refinancing thus depress the housing market further, keeing housing prices declining and
distressed sales rising.

IV SUMMARY STATISTICS
Figure 8-10 show the regional pattern of real housing price index, proportion of
distressed sales in total housing transaction, and employment population ratio. Data are
divided into four groups: HP1, HP2, HP3, HP4, representing states where decline in housing
prices was between -7.4%—0.9%, 0.9%—9.5%, 9.5%—28.7% and 28.7%—39.9%,
respectively in Feroli et al. (2012). January 2000 is the base year.
In figure 8, all four groups witnessed housing price appreciation in various degrees until
2006, when the housing price indexes began to plummet for all regions. The regional patterns
of the portion of distressed sales in total housing transaction in figure 9 were less clear-cut
compared to those of the housing price indexes. Between 2000 and 2006, the period of the
housing boom, the distressed sales proportions were volatile in a relatively small range,
compared with housing price indexes, except for group HP4. In region HP4, during the
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period of housing boom, the distressed sales proportion declined steadily accompanied with
rapid growth in housing price index. However, the magnitude of decline in distressed sales
proportion was much smaller than that of the housing price index. Then, since the end of
2007, the mild decline in distressed sales proportion turned into dramatical surge while
housing price indexes kept dropping. Data of HP4 suggest that housing price index and
distressed sales are negatively related. However, this negative correlation is less obvious in
other regions before 2007, since distressed sales proportions were relatively stable in HP1,
HP2, and HP3, fluctuating between 0 and 0.1. After 2007, distressed sales proportion
increased quickly for all four groups. Again, patterns of distressed sales proportion were more
volatile in HP1, HP2 and HP3 than in HP4. This heterogeneity in volatility across regions
also exists in the patterns of housing price index, which may be associated with the regional
variety of correlations between housing prices and distressed sales.
In figure 10, patterns of employment population ratio growth rates were similar among
groups. First, there was temporary downswing in employment population ratio growth rates
for all four groups in early 2000 in face of increasing federal funds rate or positive federal
funds rate residual. As the federal funds rate stopped increasing or the residual became
negative, the employment population ratios picked up until the recession began in early 2001.
During the period of housing boom, employment growth is positive for all regions while the
fastest growth was observed in HP4. After the crisis began, it went down and turned to be
very negative later.
Figure 11 and figure 12 depict different monetary policy variables: ffr and ffr_r. From
2000 to 2011, it is observed that ffr_r became negative, and ffr decreased most of the time
during the recession period, indicating that there had been a monetary easing; while for other
periods, like 2004-2006, ffr_r was positive for most of the time, and ffr increased quickly,
suggesting that monetary policy was tighter.
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Thus, figure 8-12 add some support to hypothesis (1)- (4).
For convenience, I divide the four groups further into eight groups based on
geographical concentration. HP1 is divided into HP1_A and HP1_B; HP2 is divided into
HP2_A, HP2_B and HP2_C; HP3 remains unchanged; while HP4 is divided into HP4_A and
HP4_B, as in table 119.

19

All tables are placed in Appendix B.
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CHAPTER 4

MODEL AND CONCLUSION

I MODEL AND METHODOLOGY
This dissertation uses VAR to explore the linkage between housing variables and the
monetary policy variable: (1) the basic VAR for each MSA to detect the local interaction ; (2)
the aggregate VAR to detect the overall interaction.
The p-th order Vector Auto-regressive (VAR) models, also stated as VAR(p) process,
has the following form:
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yt =(em_pop_2010t, tot_3M_pert, in_R_2000t, dis_pt, ffr_rt )
where em_pop_2010 is the proportion of employed people in total population in 2010,
tot_3M_per is the per capita total transaction of housing that lasts three months, in_R_2000 is
the real housing price index using Jan 2000 as the base year , dis_p is the proportion of
distressed sales that last three months in total transaction of housing , and ffr_r is the residual
of federal funds rate as in Morgan (1993). All variables are transformed according to Stock

20

Lütkepohl, H. (2005). New introduction to multiple time series analysis
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and Watson (2002) for stationarity. Eigenvalues of Aj are found to have modulus smaller than
1, to satisfy the stability condition. Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on conducted to
assure the stationarity of variables. Coefficients of VAR(p) are obtained by Least Square
method given that VAR(p) is stationary and stable. Optimal numbers of lags are chosen by
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Granger Causality Test is adopted to test if
coefficients of VAR estimators are jointly zero.
To capture the interactions between variables, the VAR(p) model can be written in its
Moving Average (MA) form:


Yt  Y    (i )Vt i ,
i 0

where Y np1 is a matrix of constants, Vt i is the structural shock to dependent variables at
period t-i , and,  jk (i ) represents the response of j th dependent variable given an impulse to
the k th variable at period t-i. The shock to the k th variable is constructed to assure that no
shock occurs to other variables. Thus,  jk (i ) is the coefficient of the orthogonal impulse
response function.
To identify the shock, one commonly used scheme in standard literature is the Choleski
Decomposition, which assumes that variables in the system have contemporaneous effects on
the ones ranked after them while the opposite is not true. Thus, ordering of variables matter
for the interpretation of result.
Previous literatures have ranked variables differently based on different assumptions of
economics theory. In this dissertation, I follow Carlino and Defina(1998)21, Goodhart and
Hofmann (2001), Fratantoni and Schuh((2003), and Musso et al. (2011), arranging variables
in the order of employed proportion, housing variables and monetary policy variable. Under
Choleski identification scheme, the implicit assumption is that employed proportion and

21

Carlino and DeFina (1998) does not include housing variables in the VAR.
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housing variables have contemporaneous effects on the monetary policy variable while they
respond to the change in monetary policy with a lag. In addition, housing prices rank after
housing transaction since housing prices are sticky.22

II

EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

⒈ Estimation Result of an Aggregate VAR
I first estimate an aggregate VAR model containing employment, total housing
transactions, distressed sales proportion and the federal funds rate residual. The aggregate
data of employment, total housing transaction, distressed sales are obtained by adding
together data of 119 MSAs. The housing price index is the composite price index calculated
by FNC.
Estimation result suggests that, given a positive monetary policy shock, employment,
total housing transaction and real housing price index will decrease and distressed sales
proportion will increase, as expected. The effect of monetary policy is statistically significant
on total housing transaction, real housing price index and distressed sales proportion at 10%
significance level. Impulse response graphs show that when the federal funds rate residual
increases by one unit, the employment and the housing price index will decrease by about
0.008 and 0.011, and the distressed sales proportion will increase by about 0.034.
On the other hand, employment and housing variables jointly granger cause the federal
funds rate residual to respond at 1% significance level. Respectively, the granger causality
relationships between employment and the monetary policy variable are statistically
significant at 10% level, and for total housing transaction and distressed sales, the lowest
significance level is 1%; while for the real housing price index, it is statistically insignificant

22

Aoki et al. (2004), Goodhart and Hofmann (2001).
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at 10% significance level. Thus, on national level, monetary policy responds to changes in
employment, total housing transaction and distressed sales, but not to the real housing price
index.

⒉ Estimation Results of MSA VARs23

⑴ Federal Funds Rate Residual as an Impulse Variable
① The Response of Employment
In total, employment decreases immediately in 73 out of 119 MSAs in face of a positive
orthogonal monetary policy shock, with 38 of them being statistically significant at 10% level.
More than half of these 38 MSAs are in HP2_A, HP2_B and HP4_A, mainly located in the
Far West and Southeast24 and generally having larger impulse responses. The average
decrease of employment in these 38 MSAs is 0.048.
There also exists considerable difference in the magnitude of decrease across groups. In
HP4_A, given one unit of positive shock in monetary policy, employment decreases by 0.103
on average, which is the highest. And nearly half of these MSAs in HP4_A observe that
employment responds negatively negatively with the maximum decline equaling 0.344.
Group HP2_A has second most number of MSAs where employment would decrease
significantly responding to tightening monetary policy and third highest average decrease in
employment, which is 0.05. Impulse response graphs also show that, in 46 MSAs,
employment increases given a positive monetary shock. And, in 31 MSAs, the hypothesis that
monetary policy does not granger cause employment can be rejected at 10% significance
level. Eleven of these MSAs, are in HP4_B and one is in HP1_B. The rest are evenly
distributed across groups.
23

Results are summarized in table 4.

24

The BEA divisions.
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Thus, employment is most adversely affected by monetary policy in HP2_A, HP2_B and
HP4_A, and is least affected in HP4_B, HP1_A and HP1_B.

②

Response of Housing Price Index
Housing price index is found to decrease in 86 out of 119 MSAs, and to increase in the

rest 33 MSAs, given a positive shock in monetary policy. The decrease and increase in the
housing price index are statistically significant at 10% level in 57 and 17 MSAs, respectively.
Main results are as following:
First, monetary policy has greater influence in HP4_A and HP4_B since over 65% of
MSAs in these two regions observe housing prices being negatively affected by monetary
tightening.
Second, MSAs where housing price index decline more in face of tightening monetary
policy roughly evenly located across groups except for HP1_A and HP1_B, mainly in the
middle of the U.S.. The largest decrease in housing price index, 0.146, is in HP4_A. Thus,
housing price index is most negatively affected by monetary policy in the east and west.
Last, the overall average decrease of housing price index to a monetary policy shock is
0.038, smaller than that of employment. Compared to employment, variation in average
responses among groups is less obvious in the case of housing prices, ranging from 0.023 to
0.045; while for employment, the range is between 0.103 and 0.004 .
To sum up, monetary policy has more impacts on housing price index in the west and
east, namely, California and Florida, compared to in the middle part of the U.S., namely,
Texas. Since influences of monetary policy in California and Florida are distinct from those
in other states in the same BEA divisions, it makes sense to consider alternative ways of
grouping states, other then employ the BEA division.
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③

Response of Distressed Sales Proportion
Monetary policy is found to granger cause distressed sales proportion to increase in 67

MSAs and granger cause it to decrease in 43 MSAs, out of 119 MSAs in total. These 43
MSAs include approximately 56% of MSAs in HP4_B, mainly California, over 30% of
MSAs in HP1_B, HP2_B, HP2_C, and lower percentage of MSAs in HP1_A, HP2_A, and
HP3. The overall response significant at 10% is 0.0436.
There is also heterogeneity in the magnitude of effects of monetary policy across groups.
The mean increases in HP2_C and HP4_A are largest, equaling to 0.075 and 0.069,
respectively; while in HP1_A, HP2_A and HP4_B, the average positive responses of
distressed sales are lower than the aggregate response .
Above results can be generalized into three points: first, the effect of tightening
monetary policy shock is only statistically significant in some MSAs; second, the directions
of variables responding to a monetary policy shock are uncertain; third, the magnitude of
effects of monetary policy vary across regions. Therefore, the consequence of tightening
monetary policy is hard to predict according to the estimation results of VAR for MSAs.
In conclusion, monetary policy is consistently ineffective in HP1_A; while in other
regions, areas where monetary policy is effective vary for different variables, but mainly in
the coast.
⑵ Federal Funds Rate as a Response Variable
Impulse response graphs and granger causality test results also reveal how monetary
policy responds to employment, housing price index and distressed sales.
At 10% significance level, monetary policy is jointly granger caused to change by
employment, total transaction, housing price index, and distressed sales in 88 MSAs, largely
concentrated in the west and east. This is also the area where monetary policy are more
effective. Specifically, increase in employment granger causes positive response of monetary
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policy in 65 MSAs; increase in housing price index granger causes positive response of
monetary policy in 62 MSAs; and increase in distressed sales granger causes negative
response of monetary policy in 71 MSAs. Generally, monetary policy variable responds to
changes in employment and housing variables with a lag.

3. Robustness Check

Estimation results suggest that the regional heterogeneity in responses to a monetary
policy shock using federal funds rate as the monetary policy variable follows a very similar
pattern as using the residual of federal funds rate, although difference exists25.
First, at the national level, the effect of monetary policy is statistically significant on all
four variables, employment, total housing transaction, real housing price index and distressed
sales proportion, at 10% significance level. When there is one unit shock to the federal funds
rate, the employment and the housing price index will decrease by about 0.006 and 0.013,
almost the same as using the residual; and the distressed sales proportion will decrease by
about 0.019.
Second, on the MSA level, less MSAs in each region respond to a monetary policy
shock, and the magnitudes of the response are generally larger, compared to using the
residual of federal funds rate.
Third, monetary policy is still most effective on employment in the Far West and
Southeast, and is most effective on housing price index and distressed sales proportion in
coastal areas. In the middle of the U.S., for example, Texas, monetary policy is impotent on
neither of the real economical activity and the housing market.

25

Results are summarized in table 5.
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III

RESULT ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Previous studies explore the regional heterogeneity of effects of monetary policy as well

as the sources of the heterogeneity mainly based on BEA regions. Calino and Defina (1998),
Kouparitsas (2001), Owyang and Wall (2005, 2009)26 estimate effects of monetary policy
across BEA regions. Crone (2005) groups states according to the extent of co-movement
between them, which are a little different from the BEA divisions27. One common conclusion
is that monetary policy is most effective in Great Lakes and is most ineffective in Southwest
on personal income, which is viewed as evidence of the interest channel28. For other regions,
controversy exists. For example, Crone (2005) argues that Rocky Mountain is least adversely
influenced by monetary policy while Kouparitsas (2001) draws the opposite conclusion.
In line with them, I also find that monetary policy is more effective in Great Lakes
(mainly Ohio) and is less effective in Southwest (mainly Texas) after regrouping MSAs, on
employment; as for other regions, the result is a little different. Mine more closely resembles
that of Crone (2005), which finds that the response of personal income in Far West is above
average while in Mideast below average. However, the average decrease in employment in
Far West is levied up by an outlier, the Las Vegas MSA in Nevada. Excluding this MSA, the
average response of employment in Far West is relatively small, in accordance with the
interest rate channel theory. Another abnormal state under this framework is Florida, where
the responsiveness of employment is also relatively big. One thing in common between Las
Vegas and Florida is that tourism makes up a significant sector of the economy. Since tourism
should be highly positively correlated with income growth, which is depressed under
tightening monetary policy, economy highly dependent on tourism can be sensitive to
changes in monetary policy, through the wealth effect channel. Another main difference is for
26

Owyang and Wall (2005, 2009) divide the eight BEA regions into 19 sub-regions excluding Alaska, Hawaii.
Crone (2005) defines that Far West , Southwest, Rocky Mountains and Plains differently. But New England,
Mideast, Southeast, and Great Lakes are the same as the BEA division.
27
28

Updated information about regional industry composition is provided in table 6.
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Rocky Mountain: Crone find that the influence of monetary policy in Rocky Mountain is
relatively small while I reach the opposite conclusion29.
Other factors are also considered to explain the regional heterogeneity in the efficacy of
monetary policy, including ease of access to refinancing for both borrowers and lenders
(Calino and Defina, 1998; Owyang and Wall, 2009), initial state of the regions (Fratantoni
and Schuh, 2003) , characteristics of financial system (Iacoviello and Minetti, 2008), the
housing sectors (Fielding and Shields, 2011; Fratantoni and Schuh, 2003). But the evidence is
mixed.
Not many agreements have been reached on sources of the heterogeneous responses of
regional housing markets to monetary policy in the literature. My estimation results suggest
that a tightening monetary policy is most effective in California, and Florida (HP4_A and
HP4_B) and to be least effective in Texas (HP1_A).
One potential explanation for this result is the elasticity of housing supply. Goodman
and Thibodeau (2008) and Sai (2010)30,

31

both estimate housing supply elasticities for a

large number of MSAs in the U.S. Both study find that Florida, California and Texas. That is,
the housing supply is relatively inelastic in Florida and California, and is generally elastic in
Texas, verifying the hypothesis ⑹ that, monetary policy is more effective given that housing
supply is inelastic. For Ohio, the two study conflict. Goodman and Thibodeau where the
housing supply is thought to be highly inelastic while Saiz (2010) disagrees. Since the effect
of monetary policy on housing prices in Ohio is less likely to be statistically insignificant, the
estimates of Saiz (2010) better describe my result.
An alternative potential explanation for the heterogeneity in the housing sector
responding to monetary policy is the credit condition. I use the Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV) to
29

The data set contains 10 MSAs in Rocky Mountain and in 4 MSAs, the decrease in the employment is
statistically significant at 10%, 3 of which is in CO. Thus this result may not be representative.
30
Goodman and Thibodeau (2008) estimate the elasticities of housing supply in 133 MSAs using HUD’s State
of the Cities Data System during 1990–2000.
31
Estimates in Goodman and Thibodeau (2008) and Saiz (2010) are summarized in table 7.
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be proxy for credit availability. According to Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010), LTV
ratio is negatively related to the cost of default for collateral. When the LTV ratio is low, the
potential loss from collateral default is high. Considering this, banks will be reluctant to lend
and credit tightens while low values of LTV ratio suggest the opposite. FHFA provides data
on Loan-to-Price Ratios (LTP) in the housing sector from 2000-2010 for 25 MSAs in my data
set. In table 9, the average for 25 MSAs is 75.68: 15 are above and 10 are below. In 10 MSAs
where LTP ratio is low, or, credit is tight, monetary policy is effective on housing prices in 8
MSAs and effective on distressed sales in 6 MSAs. In the remaining 15 MSAs where credit is
loose, the number of MSAs are 3 and 5 for monetary policy to be effective on housing prices
and distressed sales, respectively. State level data during 2000-2011 suggests that credit is
always tightest in California, while in Texas and Florida, the numbers are approximately the
average.
In conclusion, estimations of regional VAR and aggregate VAR suggest that in the recent
decade, a contractionary monetary policy tends to tighten the economy and the housing
market: employment and housing prices will decrease, and distressed sales will increase. This
tightening influence varies across regions: the costal area (the east and the west) is more
affected by monetary policy while in the middle part, monetary policy is more likely to be
ineffective, on both employment and the housing sector. This heterogeneity may be caused by
various factors, like industry composition, housing supply elasticities, and credit conditions.
The monetary authority may want to take this into account while forming policies.
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Figure 1:

Housing Starts of the U.S. during Jan 1959- Dec 2012

Source: ST. LOUIS FED Economic Data.

Figure 2: The Unemployment Rate of the U.S. During Jan 1975- Dec 2012

Sources: ST. LOUIS FED Economic Data
U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 3: The Real Housing Price Index of the U.S. During 1975-2012
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Figure 4: Housing Starts of the U.S. During 1975-2012
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Figure 5: The Foreclosure Rate of the U.S. During 1970-2010
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Figure 6: Standardized Real Housing Price Index During 1975-2012
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Figure 7: The unemployment rate of regions during 1976-2012
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Figure 8: Real Housing Price Index for Groups During Jan 2000-July2011
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Figure 9: Distressed Sales Proportion for Groups During Jan 2000-July201121
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Figure 10: Growth Rate of Employment Population Ratio for Groups During
Jan 2000-July2011
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Figure 11: ffr_r During Jan 2000-July 2011

Source: ST. LOUIS FED Economic Data, calculated following Morgan (1993)

Figure 12: ffr During Jan 2000-July 2011

Source: ST. LOUIS FED Economic Data
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Figure 13: VAR Estimated Using Aggregate Data and ffr_r as Measurement of Monetary
Policy Stance
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Figure 14: VAR Estimated Using Aggregate Data and ffr as Measurement of Monetary
Policy Stance
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Figure 15

VAR Estimated Using MSA Data and ffr_r as Measurement of Monetary Policy
Stance
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APPENDIX B: TABLE AND RESULTS
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Table 1:

List of Groups and States

Notes: Following Feroli et al. (2012)

87

Table 2: List of MSAs

88

89

90

Table 3: Group Descriptive Statistics
3.1: Housing Price Index ( ln (index_r_2000) )

Source: FNC.

3.2: Distressed Sales Proportion (dis_p)

Source: FNC.

91

3.3: Growth Rate of Employment Population Ratio (d1_lnem_pop_2010)

Sources:

U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics
U.S. Bureau of the Census.

3.4: Growth Rate of Per Capita Total Transaction of Housing

Source: FNC.
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Table 4: Group Summaries of Estimation Results using ffr_r
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Table 5: Group Summaries of Estimation Results using ffr
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Table 6: Percent of Regional Industry Employment and Gross Product Accounted for in Total
Industry Employment and Gross Product

Notes: 1. SIC is used for industrial identification before 1997 while NAICS is used afterwards.
2. Results in column 2-5 are calculated by author and results in column 6 and 7 are from in Carlino and Defina
(1998).
Sources: BEA
U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

95

Table 7: Supply Elasticity of Housing (εs) on the State Level

Notes : 1. The state supply elasticities of housing are calculated by taking simple averages of housing supply
elasticities in MSAs.
2. Column 3 is calculated by excluding all negative estimates of housing supply elasticities.
Sources: Goodman and Thibodeau (2008), Saiz (2010).
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Table 8: Average State LTP Ratio During 2000-2011

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

97

Table 9: Average MSA LTP Ratio and the Regional Effectiveness of Monetary Policy During
2000-2011

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency
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APPENDIX C: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION

99

Note: All transformed data are standardized, following Stock and Watson (2002).
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